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Abstract
Industrial policy rarely features in analysis of post-crisis economic policy change in Britain, despite 
manufacturing featuring centrally in the ‘rebalancing’ narrative espoused by elites since 2008. The 
article seeks to interrogate the character of recent governments’ approaches to industrial policy 
and manufacturing industries. It does so through the prism of Peter Hall’s ‘three orders of policy 
change’ framework, with particular reference to its application to macroprudential regulation by 
Andrew Baker. The article argues that the framework must be furnished with additional variables, 
namely, the type of institutional arrangements related to the policy area, and the status of the 
associated economic activities within the wider growth model, in order to better understand 
how ideas, institutions and interests interact in processes of policy change. The article finds little 
evidence of a ‘paradigm shift’ and suggests that innovations in industrial policy have served to 
reinforce the foundational assumptions of the British growth model.
Keywords
British industrial policy, coalition government, conservative government, institutionalism, 
manufacturing, post-crisis policy change, rebalancing
Introduction
The nature and extent of economic policy change since the financial crisis have been an 
important concern within British political science in recent years, with analyses often 
framed by longstanding debates within political economy in particular over the causal role 
that crises play in the transformation (or otherwise) of policy regimes and their ideological 
framing (Baker, 2015; Bell and Hindmoor, 2015; Blyth, 2013a; Engelen et al., 2011; 
Gamble, 2014; Hay, 2013; Hay and Smith, 2013). Industrial policy rarely features in such 
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analysis where the British case is the main or exclusive focus (although see Berry (2015) 
and Craig (2015) for partial exceptions). Yet industrial policy change has been a recurring 
feature of political discourse in Britain since 2008, as demonstrated principally by the 
‘rebalancing’ narrative espoused largely by Conservative politicians and particularly by 
then Chancellor of the Exchequer George Osborne’s now infamous rhetoric on ‘the march 
of the makers’. In general, this discourse extols the importance of rebuilding Britain’s 
manufacturing sector, therefore suggesting the need for a stronger focus by government on 
supporting manufacturing industries through industrial policy (Berry and Hay, 2016; 
Froud et al., 2011). The discourse appears to have been matched by a plethora of policy 
initiatives emanating principally from the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills 
(BIS) (led under the 2010–2015 coalition government by the Liberal Democrat cabinet 
minister Vince Cable) which suggest new directions in British industrial policy in favour 
of a stronger role for government in relation to the market, and the value of a sectoral as 
well as horizontal approach to industrial policy. Although the Conservative Party’s interest 
in industrial policy arguably waned after the 2015 election, if not before, Theresa May 
appeared to make industrial policy one of her key priorities in her first speech after replac-
ing David Cameron as Prime Minister following the European Union (EU) referendum.
British policy-makers are claiming that industrial policy is changing or will change in 
response to economic crisis, yet scholarly interest in this possibility has been muted. This 
article is an attempt to fill this gap. Industrial policy is often defined with reference to the 
distinction between ‘horizontal’ approaches (improving the general business environment 
across the whole economy) and ‘vertical’ approaches (supporting a single set of indus-
tries). The distinction has in fact been a significant feature of policy-making discourse in 
Britain, especially recently, but it should be pointed out that this article assumes the latter 
is more appropriate in terms of defining industrial policy. Industrial policy essentially 
involves deliberately favouring particular industries over others, irrespective of market 
signals. This approach will involve favouring and indeed empowering some private eco-
nomic actors over others, but also represents a means by which the behaviour of these 
actors is kept in check, as they are incentivised to pursue public goods. The public good 
at the heart of industrial policy is essentially productivity. It is for this reason that support-
ing manufacturing industries is at the core of most meaningful industrial policy defini-
tions because, irrespective of how well this is captured by statistical typologies, as the 
term theoretically encompasses all instances of technology being applied to natural 
resources, the sector is the progenitor of productivity growth within capitalist systems 
(Chang, 2014: 256–267). Of course, other forms of state regulation may resemble indus-
trial policy in some ways (especially, as explored below, in relation to shaping market 
forces), but generally speaking, it is the long-term and risky nature of the investment 
required to upgrade manufacturing processes that generates the ‘market failure’ which 
industrial policy seeks to remedy.
The article surveys post-crisis industrial policy in Britain through the prism of Peter 
Hall’s (1993) institutionalist ‘three orders of policy change’ framework—used to explain 
the shift from Keynesianism to monetarism in British macroeconomic policy in the late 
1970s and early 1980s—but particularly as applied by Andrew Baker (2015) to post-crisis 
change within financial regulation in Britain. First-order change refers to the revision of 
numerical or quantitative terms associated with existing policy instruments, and second-
order change denotes the replacement of these instruments with alternative policy levers. 
Third-order change is largely synonymous with a Kuhnian ‘paradigm shift’ and relates 
both to the ideas and assumptions that underpin key policy priorities and the ordering of 
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priorities within economic statecraft. The three orders of change may occur concurrently 
rather than consecutively; Hall’s argument is that processes of first- and second-order 
change, involving policy learning and entrepreneurship, are necessary before third-order 
change can be complete. Baker, however, introduces a new variable into the framework, 
based on the notion that there are ‘varieties of economic crisis’. Simply, while Hall docu-
mented policy change during and after the ‘slow burn’ crisis of Keynesianism, involving 
sluggish growth and obstinate inflation in the 1970s, Baker is documenting policy change 
following the ‘explosive’ financial crisis of 2008. As such, he sought to demonstrate that 
the third-order paradigm shift in financial regulation occurred relatively quickly after the 
crisis, as elites appeared to agree on the need for macroprudential regulation, but that the 
first- and second-order implementation of the related policy instruments has been much 
more difficult due to contestation by key stakeholders.
The focus here on industrial policy allows further reflection upon the difference that 
the density and status of the institutional arrangements make to the character of policy 
change and how it is discussed publicly by elites. It is certainly the case that elites have 
pronounced significant industrial policy change in the post-crisis period—yet the practi-
cal significance of the new programmes actually implemented is less clear. The article’s 
objective is to understand what industrial policy change tells us about post-crisis eco-
nomic statecraft in Britain and what we can learn from this case about the process of 
post-crisis economic policy change in general. It is recognised, however, that unlike mac-
roeconomic policy and financial regulation, the institutional framework within Britain 
around industrial policy cannot be taken for granted. The analysis here is essentially 
developed through an institutionalist lens since policy is ultimately a function of institu-
tions but recognises both variations in institutional forms and the political-economic con-
texts within which policy-making institutions operate. One of the key, specific concerns 
here is the role of a particular set of policy-making and delivery bodies within a wider 
institutional framework of economic statecraft. This topic necessitates a focus on both the 
material context which shapes hierarchies among institutions and the ideational meanings 
contained in seemingly technocratic inter-institutional dialogue.
The article’s most important claim is that in assessing post-crisis economic policy 
change, we need to assess not only the type of crisis that has seemingly occurred but also 
the place of the economic activities (and the surrounding policy framework) said to have 
experienced crisis within the wider model of economic growth. Hall and Baker could take 
for granted not only that an identifiable institutional framework in the policy area being 
studied existed but also that the economic activities to which it pertained related to core 
features of the British economy. The fact that this is not the case in relation to manufactur-
ing and industrial policy not only helps us to understand the nature of the change that has 
occurred, it may also paradoxically explain why elites were able to adopt such a radical 
pro-manufacturing discourse in the wake of the 2008 crisis: they were able to speak 
freely, and perhaps somewhat duplicitously, because the possibility of paradigm change 
within British industrial policy was so distant, even inconceivable. The discourse on 
industrial policy may have seemed to invoke radical ideas, but its meaning was ultimately 
conservative insofar as it upheld and perhaps even reinforced the dominant assumptions 
of sound economic management more generally. The article first explores the Hall/Baker 
analytical framework, in the context of other developments in institutionalist scholarship 
and political economy in general, before examining in depth the development of British 
industrial policy (and associated discourses) since 2008, with reference to the historical 
context of manufacturing decline.
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Policy change, institutions and growth models
Peter Hall’s 1993 paper ‘Policy paradigms, social learning, and the state’ has proven to be 
a landmark publication in the development of institutionalist thought. Hall developed the 
notion that policy-making processes are sites of learning, experimentation and entrepre-
neurship, and inverted conventional wisdom on how paradigm shifts in post-crisis policy 
transformation may occur, in that such phenomena are shown to precede paradigmatic 
change as the perception that a crisis is evident takes root among elites. The emergence of 
alternative intellectual frameworks in response to perceived crises is of course part of the 
context within which policy learning, experimentation and entrepreneurship occur, but 
third-order change is only secure once piecemeal and technocratic reforms gain wider 
political support, leading to the political elite in general reordering the hierarchy of eco-
nomic policy goals.
Of course, Hall’s conclusions were based on a single case study, that is, British macro-
economic policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s, as Keynesian instruments were 
replaced by monetarist instruments. In examining financial regulation following the 2008 
crisis, Andrew Baker (2015) introduces a variable not substantively considered by Hall, 
that is, the variety of crisis to which elites are seeking to respond. The crisis of 
Keynesianism was ‘very much a slow burning long term economic crisis of stagnation’ 
typified by a persistent lack of growth and rising inflation (Baker, 2015: 348–349), but the 
2008 crisis, especially in relation to the finance sector (hence its normal designation as a 
financial crisis), was ‘explosive’, ‘dramatic’ and ‘extreme’ and related not to a persis-
tently under-performing economy, but rather an exigent ‘malfunction’ in the financial 
system (Baker, 2015: 348, 353–354). Falling liquidity and asset prices, and severe credit 
tightening, created both an empirical demonstration of the falsity of the efficient markets 
paradigm that had hitherto underpinned financial regulation and an urgent need for an 
alternative approach to regulation to be enacted.
What quickly emerged was a near-universal endorsement of macroprudential regula-
tion, principally in the form of capital requirements on financial institutions, among eco-
nomic policy-makers in Britain (and replicated elsewhere). As such, ‘the sequencing at 
work in the case of the macroprudential ideational shift was exactly the reverse of that 
evident in the case of the UK macroeconomic policy in the 1970s’ (Baker, 2015: 354–
355). However, while third-order change came easily, subsequent first- and second-order 
change has been slower, with significant debate over the precise details of the new restric-
tions on financial institutions. As Baker explained in greater depth in an earlier article, the 
application of new forms of financial regulation has become contested, thereby risking 
the dilution of the policy content (Baker, 2013; see also Baker and Widmaier, 2014). Yet 
as Baker’s earlier analysis and direct engagement with Hall demonstrates, while the pro-
cess of policy change may be explicable due to the variety of crisis, macroprudential 
regulation is also a very different type of policy change than Hall’s monetarist shift, in 
terms of both policy form and content. Indeed, macroprudential regulation actually 
resembles industrial policy as understood here, insofar as it is focused on shaping a par-
ticular industry, both empowering the finance sector (by mitigating its volatility) and 
curbing the excesses, in the name of public good, that a largely market-based structure 
appears to permit. Ostensibly, macroeconomic policy has no such objectives and focuses 
rather on the environment within which all industries operate. Although it is clearly not 
the case that monetarism faced no opposition, this perhaps helps to explain how its imple-
mentation faced a less organised (and perhaps less politically astute) form of resistance.
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Baker’s engagement with Hall’s approach, two decades on, is clearly cognisant of sub-
sequent developments within institutionalist theory, including within Hall’s own work. 
The ‘varieties of capitalism’ framework, developed by Hall and David Soskice (2001), has 
rightly been criticised for appearing to endorse a form of rational choice institutionalism, 
with different capitalist varieties each producing policies consistent with the form of equi-
librium dictated by their institutional configuration (Clift, 2012; Hay, 2005). But it is, at 
root, an attempt to demonstrate the role of material context in shaping processes of policy 
learning within institutions and has subsequently been applied as such (see also Streeck, 
2011). Mark Blyth (2013b), one of the leading advocates of constructivist or discursive 
institutionalism, argues that the ‘three orders’ framework hinges around a tension between 
Hall’s rational choice proclivity and a constructivist account of policy innovation which 
emphasises the ontological significance of the ideational realm. For Blyth, the aftermath of 
the 2008 crisis means the constructivist dimension of Hall’s work has been vindicated, 
precisely because of the absence of paradigmatic change in relation to macroeconomic 
policy. First- and second-order change in the immediate wake of the crisis did not coalesce 
with third-order change because the third order, for Blyth, is to some extent autonomous. 
Ideas gain weight within institutionalised processes, but cannot be reduced to them.
The key contention of constructivist or discursive institutionalism is that inter-subjective 
ideas about economic context are as important as (or constitutive of) the materiality of 
economic life in terms of shaping economic policy (Blyth, 2002; Hay, 2006; Schmidt, 
2010). The perspective does not simply rest on the assumption that ‘ideas matter’ within 
institutionalised environments. The aim is not simply to bring ideas back in, but rather to 
use ideational analysis to demonstrate the connections between institutional practice (and 
change) and wider political and economic contexts, insofar as these are reflected in the 
conduct of situated, reflexive agents (cf. Bell, 2011). (Indeed, constructivist institutional-
ism is not immune to the charge that it remains wedded to a materialist ontology in 
explaining how new ideas are ultimately generated (Berry, 2011: 26–31, 43–48).) In this 
way, the operation of institutions is shaped by their (re)production within a particular 
socio-economic context and also by the agents of (re)production, who will have (both 
conflicting and complementary) ideas about this context, and the nature and purpose of 
the institutions they are situated within.
Clearly, unless institutionalists are able to bring the wider material and ideational envi-
ronment into analysis of policy-making institutions, they will struggle to account for how 
new policy ideas are generated. Baker (2015: 354) is able to side-step this problem by 
focusing on a dense set of institutional practices within which the idea of macroprudential 
regulation had ‘a prior intellectual presence’ domestically and internationally. This focus 
gives Baker licence not to inquire into the genesis of the set of ideas in question and there-
fore raises doubts about the applicability of his approach to areas of policy where the 
same conditions might not pertain. The existence (or otherwise) of a prior intellectual 
presence for a more activist approach to industrial policy is probably inconsequential 
given the subservience and vulnerability of industrial policy-making bodies within the 
wider economic policy arena. However, even in the case of macroprudential regulation, it 
appears that relevant ideational factors are being overlooked, insofar as Baker neatly 
distinguishes between disruption in the ‘foundational assumptions’ of financial regulation 
since 2008 and continuity in those pertaining to macroeconomic policy. Yet it is surely the 
case that the disruptive ideas in the former case remain largely consistent with the ideas 
that continue to underpin the latter (Geoffrey Underhill (2015: 463–464) makes this point 
in relation to macroprudential regulation among international institutions). This should not 
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surprise us given that, at the highest elite level, there is a significant overlap across the groups 
of policy-makers that determine both macroeconomic policy and financial regulation. As 
explored below, we can say the same about industrial policy, even if the same dynamic pro-
duces different results. The institutionalised overlaps between different policy-making insti-
tutions must be part of any institutionalist account of policy change.
As such, although this applies to every policy area to some extent, it is clearly the case that, 
especially in Britain, industrial policy outcomes do not simply consist of the policy choices 
that industrial policy institutions produce. There are clearly fewer formal institutions dedi-
cated to industrial policy, and those that do exist do not enjoy a commensurate degree of 
autonomy from more powerful bodies and established practice. The ‘growth model’ analytical 
framework developed by Colin Hay (2013) with reference primarily to the British case, but 
with antecedents in the more comparative varieties of capitalism and regime theory literatures, 
offers a useful device for recognising the interaction between institutions, ideas and economic 
practice. A growth model is understood here as the coalescence of the main sources of growth 
within the economy (especially insofar as they are distinguishable from other economies), the 
orientation of political and economic institutions configured to enable the associated eco-
nomic activities (and reconfigure these activities when necessary), the ideas about economic 
life (and how it should be governed) that sustain the established order and the distribution of 
wealth and power that both results from and helps to reproduce the status quo.
The seemingly limited importance of manufacturing to the British economy compared 
with similar economies obviously helps to explain the limited attention post-crisis indus-
trial policy has received among political scientists and political economists, yet acknowl-
edging this status is also crucial to understanding how industrial policy has developed in 
recent years. It was noted earlier that there were ostensible similarities between macro-
prudential regulation and industrial policy, suggesting that Baker’s work demonstrates 
that the focus of the latter on one particular sector enabled an organised, yet subtle, form 
of resistance. Of course, the industries impacted by the two policy areas differ substan-
tially in terms of their centrality to the British economy (or at least its distinguishing 
features). It is perhaps not the existence of organised resistance to industrial policy change 
which matters most, but rather the absence of any organised advocacy.
Industrial policy in post-crisis Britain
The implication for the current inquiry is that post-crisis industrial policy change matters, 
but it should not be approached as equivalent to macroeconomic policy or financial regu-
latory change. Hall and Baker were able to take for granted that the policy area being 
studied was of paramount importance to the growth model (in Hall’s case, of any capital-
ist economy, and in Baker’s case, certainly the British economy) and that there existed a 
dedicated and relatively dense set of institutions and institutionalised practices to study 
for signs of transformation. Analytically, manufacturing and industrial policy have a 
lower status within the British growth model. Whether occurring before, after or along-
side third-order change, there is less scope for first- and second-order policy changes 
within actual policy mechanisms, since the required institutional arrangements are under-
developed. After briefly discussing the relevant historical context in terms of manufactur-
ing decline and industrial policy traditions in Britain, this section details policy and 
discursive changes relating to manufacturing and industrial policy, drawing upon official 
policy documents, public remarks by policy-makers and, to a lesser extent, material 
related to the perspectives of non-governmental elite actors.
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Historical context
Although ‘declinist’ accounts of British economic history remain controversial, there is 
little doubt that, defined in conventional terms, the British manufacturing sector has been 
in decline for a very long period of time, arguably since the late 19th century. Manufacturing 
output and employment have fallen significantly as a proportion of overall output and 
employment in the British economy and British manufacturing has fallen significantly as 
a proportion of global manufacturing on the same measures. Furthermore, the faster pace 
of manufacturing decline in the postwar era is not simply a function of the recent and 
fairly rapid economic development of East Asian countries; Britain has also been losing 
higher skilled manufacturing jobs to Organisation for Economic Co-operation and 
Development (OECD) countries in recent decades and has shown few signs of develop-
ing high-tech or advanced manufacturing economies on any significant scale (English 
and Kenny, 2000; House of Commons Library, 2015; Matthews, 2007; Pilat et al., 2006; 
Williams et al., 1983). Decline has continued since the 2008 crisis. The manufacturing 
sector suffered disproportionately during the recession; even before the very recent tur-
moil associated with Brexit, output was more than 6% below its pre-crisis ‘peak’ in 2007, 
and manufacturing had shrunk in relative terms to comprise an even smaller portion of the 
British economy. A total of 300,000 manufacturing jobs have been lost over this period—
yet this actually represents a slower rate of job losses than has been evident from the 
1980s onwards, and particularly the immediate pre-crisis years.1
While political discourse around manufacturing since 2008 (or more precisely 2010) 
suggests that policy-makers are responding to an exigent crisis in the sector, it would clearly 
be inaccurate to describe British manufacturing as having experienced an ‘explosive’ crisis 
in 2008, despite the impact of the subsequent recession; there was no malfunction, but 
rather, arguably, an exacerbation of extant trends. Overall, the events of 2008 do not repre-
sent a significant moment of upheaval for British manufacturing. Does this mean that manu-
facturing has experienced a ‘slow burn’ crisis? Perhaps, but the decline of manufacturing 
has been treated by policy elites not as a problem to be solved, but rather a habitual condi-
tion or a fact to be accommodated—or indeed celebrated, insofar as it might be considered 
the flipside of other, more welcome economic trends. If manufacturing ever was central to 
the British growth model, it became significantly less so by the late 20th century. This was 
both demonstrated and reinforced by the failure to firmly establish industrial policy mecha-
nisms in the late 19th and early 20th century as Germany, Japan and the United States 
‘caught up’ to the manufacturing capacity developed in Britain following the industrial 
revolution. This view relies of course upon the definition of industrial policy (and its rela-
tionship with manufacturing) advanced in the ‘Introduction’ section. British policy-makers 
would generally claim that Britain has long upheld a functional industrial policy regime, 
albeit one that operates ‘horizontally’ to improve the general business environment across 
the whole economy, rather than ‘vertically’ to support a single set of industries.
As such, direct support for manufacturers has generally taken the form of ‘soft’ inter-
ventions such as advice services and the dissemination of best practice and tax allowances 
for R&D or capital investment (Buigues and Sekkat, 2009). British industrial policy has 
often essentially taken the form of regional policy—an orientation that intensified in the 
1990s and especially after the election of Tony Blair’s Labour government in 1997. 
However, while through regional policy mechanisms parts of the state appeared to take 
on a more interventionist pose, this was often limited, again, to defensive moves, in sup-
port of regions undergoing hardship associated with deindustrialisation. Interventions 
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have often took the form of offering investment incentives to foreign corporations. Most 
often, the regional layer simply replicated the horizontal approach of national govern-
ment, and indeed probably reinforced it, by encouraging all regions to pursue similar 
economic objectives, often in competition with each other and paradoxically with little 
sense that strategies were genuinely ‘place-based’ (Bailey et al., 2015; Bailey and 
Driffield, 2007). It should be noted that in the 1970s, Harold Wilson’s Labour govern-
ment introduced a more interventionist approach, involving direct subsidies and planning 
agreements, although the agenda became largely focused on defensive interventions to 
rescue unproductive firms and industries (Coates, 2015). While short-lived, this episode 
is interesting for illuminating a point made in the previous section, that is, that policy 
change in relation to manufacturing may be propelled not simply by a perception of crisis 
in British manufacturing, but rather difficulties in the economy more generally requiring 
a renewed focus on the manufacturing sector—yet this may in fact help to explain its 
ephemerality. In contrast, we can speculate that policy change associated with macropru-
dential regulation arises from the perception of crisis which pertains to the finance sector 
alone, rather than the economy more widely. These perceptions may differ precisely 
because manufacturing and finance occupy different places within the British growth 
model, but the constraining effect on policy innovation is nevertheless quite similar.
Post-crisis industrial policy and discursive change
Industrial policy became more prominent within British economic policy before the 
establishment of the coalition government in 2010. Gordon Brown created BIS in 2008, 
to coincide with the return to front-line politics of Peter Mandelson, as both Business 
Secretary and First Secretary of State (the de facto Deputy Prime Minister). BIS was of 
course largely a reinvention of the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), which Brown 
had split a year earlier into the Department for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory 
Reform (BERR) and the Department for Innovation, Universities and Skills (DIUS), 
although it retained oversight of higher education, which had not been part of DTI. The 
new department published the flagship statement of Labour’s post-crisis industrial pol-
icy—the green paper New Industry, New Jobs—in April 2009 (HM Government, 2009). 
New Industry, New Jobs explained that the two key flaws of British industry were low 
R&D spending and a lack of success in translating scientific expertise into commercial 
products. Many of the policies that the coalition would go on to champion as their own 
were developed during this period, including greater venture capital investment through 
the Technology Strategy Board (which was established in 2007), more investment in 
skills, initiatives to improve access to finance for some small and medium-sized enter-
prises (SMEs) and efforts to introduce a more strategic approach to government procure-
ment (with, again, a focus on SMEs).
Interestingly, manufacturing featured relatively little in New Industry, New Jobs, 
although the paper did coincide with the announcement of some new funding for advanced 
manufacturing research centres. It is also worth noting that BERR and DIUS had in 
September 2008 jointly announced a new ‘manufacturing strategy’, although the accom-
panying document focused on celebrating what Labour had already done in government 
rather than advocating a new approach (BERR and DIUS, 2008). New Industry, New Jobs 
endorsed a more ‘strategic’ approach for government in supporting the British economy’s 
‘competitive strengths’ and indeed alluded to industrial policy’s institutional subservi-
ence by explaining that ‘[t]his means making Britain’s economic and industrial strength 
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the remit of not just the Department for Business, but of all Government departments’ 
(HM Government, 2009: 5; emphasis original). However, the paper also repeatedly 
stressed that the Brown government rejected a mythical ‘Old Labour’ view of the state, 
outlining ‘important limits’ to state intervention based on a ‘pragmatic but not dismissive 
[view] about the way markets work’. ‘The last thing the Government wants to do’, BIS 
explained, ‘is revive old theories or to invent a new ideology in managing the economy’ 
(HM Government, 2009: 21, 33–34).
Since 2010, the notion of ‘rebalancing’ has become one of the defining motifs of the 
coalition and Conservative governments, with an apparent imbalance between manufactur-
ing and the finance sector one of the core features of the rebalancing narrative. In his 2011 
budget speech, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, George Osborne, argued that ‘manufac-
turing is crucial to the rebalancing of our economy’; the finale of his speech added oratorical 
flair to this statement and indeed has quickly entered British political folklore:
We want the words ‘made in Britain’, ‘created in Britain’, ‘designed in Britain’, ‘invented in 
Britain’ to drive our nation forward. A Britain carried aloft by the march of the makers. That is 
how we will create jobs and support families. We have put fuel into the tank of the British 
economy. And I commend this Budget to the House. (Osborne, 2011)
The budget also marked the publication of the coalition’s ‘plan for growth’. The docu-
ment’s foreword—co-signed by Osborne and Business Secretary Vince Cable, a Liberal 
Democrat minister—offers a quite remarkable critique of Britain’s pre-crisis growth 
model, based as it was on ‘rising levels of debt, over-leveraged banks and an unsustain-
able property boom’. The foreword also bemoans a severe decline in manufacturing out-
put and employment and points longingly towards the success of Germany in developing 
a high-tech manufacturing base and maintaining its share of world exports (HM Treasury 
and BIS, 2011: 3–4). Critical scrutiny of the ideological connotations of the rebalancing 
concept suggests that it offers a rather conservative narrative of post-crisis economic 
policy change (Berry and Hay, 2016; Froud et al., 2011), undermining the notion that 
wholesale change in British economic statecraft is being pursued. But this does not pre-
clude a priori the possibility of meaningful industrial policy change.
There are elements of both horizontal and sectoral policies in coalition industrial policy. 
Access to finance has been an important objective, although this agenda has focused hori-
zontally on supporting SMEs, rather than manufacturers in particular. It has included loan 
guarantees that could amount to around £2 billion, in addition to the Bank of England’s 
Funding for Lending scheme, although this scheme was initially used predominantly to 
support mortgage lending. The British Business Bank enabled a more direct form of lend-
ing to SMEs, albeit with funds of only around £1.5 billion. Other horizontal measures 
include additional efforts to focus government procurement on SMEs, some additional 
funding for apprentices and the creation of enterprise zones offering tax and planning con-
cessions (and superfast broadband) for companies relocating to these areas. It is certainly 
the case, however, that the coalition government was comfortable in its public discourse 
with endorsing also a sectoral approach to manufacturing, with the emphasis in its 2012 
industrial strategy on 11 key sectors as the focus of government action. Many of the sectors 
constitute or encompass manufacturing industries or industries which might feed directly 
into manufacturing (aerospace, automotives, life sciences, nuclear, offshore wind) but also 
include many less directly relevant to industrial production (agricultural technologies, con-
struction, information economy, international education, oil and gas, professional and 
838 The British Journal of Politics and International Relations 18(4) 
business services) (HM Government, 2014). Supporting advanced manufacturing, in gen-
eral, was singled out in The Plan for Growth as an important industrial policy priority. This 
focus is borne out by some of the sectoral strategies, but also in the creation of the Advanced 
Manufacturing Supply Chain Initiative (at a cost of around £240 million) and, more spe-
cifically, catapult centres—most of which have some connection to high-tech manufactur-
ing industries—where firms and universities can collaborate on R&D and access common, 
publicly funded resources (the centres are expect to attract private funding in the medium-
term). The coalition also consistently expanded tax allowances related to capital invest-
ment, which primarily benefit manufacturers.
Clearly, however, the notion that there has been a significant shift of resources—or an 
allocation of new resources—to vertical industrial policy would be an over-statement. 
Assessing the plan as a whole, it is clear that manufacturing and industrial policy played 
a relatively restricted role within the coalition’s growth plan. In The Plan for Growth, 
arguments that might support a more interventionist industrial policy run alongside sup-
port for fiscal conservatism, lower taxes and deregulation, and flexible labour markets 
(albeit with a higher skilled workforce). Increasing investment and exports is stated as 
one of four main ambitions, yet attracting foreign direct investment (FDI) is listed as the 
main specific goal in this regard—the prospect of nurturing domestic investment is not 
explicitly referenced. Crucially, it is not simply the Treasury’s leadership of the growth 
plan that accounts for the restricted place of vertical industrial policy. In ‘sector analysis’ 
published by BIS in 2012, the department stressed that ‘[h]orizontal policies, such as set-
ting the legal and regulatory frameworks in which businesses across the economy oper-
ate, form the bedrock of industrial strategy’, but added, ‘[w]ithin this framework, it is 
crucial to take into account sector-specific effects’ (BIS, 2012: 7). The coalition’s rhetori-
cal focus on sectors is justified by officials almost entirely in terms of the government’s 
support for the overall business environment. They did, however, concede that some sec-
tors have a higher risk of innovation failure than others—therefore circumscribing quite 
carefully the grounds upon which government may intervene in particular sectors to cor-
rect market failures.
There was clearly an appetite, however, among BIS ministers to have gone much fur-
ther. In a 2011 speech, Vince Cable (2011), while maintaining that ‘picking winners’ is 
illusory, argued that government has a ‘legitimate and necessary’ role in supporting man-
ufacturing innovation:
One of the first decisions I took was to put manufacturing at the centre of our long term 
economic vision … Manufacturing contributes disproportionately to overall levels of 
productivity as well as generating half the UK’s exports of goods; and is responsible for much 
of the business R&D in this country and the innovation which drives growth. So providing the 
right framework of incentives and support will have a material effect on future rates of growth. 
(Vince Cable, 2011)
Crucially, he argues that R&D in some high-tech manufacturing industries is not 
only ‘risky’ (an argument which correlates with the overall coalition position) but also 
‘simply too complex or resource-intensive for an individual company to make the nec-
essary investment’. Cable offers therefore a more strident critique of private sector 
efficiency than most of his coalition partners. In an open letter to David Cameron and 
Deputy Prime Minister Nick Clegg (Cable’s party leader) in 2012, seemingly an attempt 
to bypass the Treasury and George Osborne (and perhaps even his own department), he 
argued that
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there is still something important missing [in the government’s industrial strategy]—a 
compelling vision of where country is heading beyond sorting out the fiscal mess; and a clear 
and confident message about how we will earn our living in the future … Market forces are 
insufficient for creating the long term industrial capacities we need. (Cable, 2012)
He continued that ‘our actions, frankly, are rather piecemeal’.
He appears to have enjoyed the support of Conservative science minister David 
Willets, who argued in favour of a sectoral approach to industrial policy in a 2012 speech, 
surmising that ‘[g]overnments find themselves making decisions about allocation of 
resources and we should not pretend that we do not. The coalition’s pledges on rebalanc-
ing the economy depend on such a view’. The Cable view was also largely endorsed by 
former Conservative minister Michael Heseltine, whose 2012 review for the coalition 
government, No Stone Unturned, is often credited with propelling the Conservative 
Party’s newfound interest in devolution (as discussed in the next sub-section). However, 
Heseltine also advocated emphatically the notion that the state, at both national and local 
levels, must support strategically important industries, such as those related to advanced 
manufacturing, and commit substantial resources to this task.
This is not to suggest that Cable et al. offered a genuinely radical vision for a paradig-
matic shift in industrial policy—they broadly advocated a more clinical focus on 
(advanced) manufacturing and supported higher spending on industrial policy, but 
stopped short of arguing against other post-crisis economic policy objectives (such as 
deficit reduction) or questioning the wider institutional framework within which indus-
trial policy mechanisms were situated. Justin Bentham et al. (2013: 2) refer to it as ‘a 
non-disruptive form of policy innovation’. Nevertheless, even this mild critique appears 
to have struggled to gain support not only within government but among elites more gen-
erally. Senior BBC economics journalist Evan Davis’ (2012: 84) book Made in Britain—
published to accompany a documentary series of the same name—argued that 
manufacturing decline ‘is a sign of success, not failure’. He argued that rebalancing was 
required following the financial crisis, but only ‘to make some adjustments to our course 
rather than reverse the direction we have taken’ (Davis, 2012: 7).
Management consultancy McKinsey made similar arguments in an influential 2010 
report titled ‘How to compete and grow’. They argue that while governments should adopt 
economic policies ‘tailored’ to particular sectors, manufacturing cannot be relied upon to 
deliver the jobs and growth jeopardised by the 2008 crisis (Manyika et al., 2010: 11–12). 
The authors unhelpfully elide job creation and output growth in this regard; manufacturing 
may be indispensable to the latter in the long term through productivity improvements, 
even while contributing disproportionately less to the former. Nevertheless, the report was 
cited in the BIS (2012: 7) sector analysis, by way of circumscribing the scope of the rebal-
ancing agenda, with the document stating simply that ‘McKinsey have argued that the 
competitiveness of sectors matters more than the sector mix in producing growth’.
The Cable position did enjoy the support of both the Confederation of British Industry 
and the Trades Union Congress (TUC) in pursuing the new industrial strategy after 2010 
(Bentham et al., 2013)—yet this is most significant insofar as it signifies the absence of a 
more radical approach to industrial policy among the trade unions. Even manufacturing 
trade body EEF (2015) has restricted itself to fairly limited or ‘non-disruptive’ proposals 
for supporting British manufacturing: its 2015 ‘manifesto for manufacturing’ advocated 
higher investment in skills and infrastructure, as well as lower taxes, but also largely 
endorsed the government’s record in establishing catapult centres and widening access to 
finance for SMEs. Hence, in industrial policy debates, we see the inverse of the organised 
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resistance to macroprudential regulation identified by Baker; advocates of industrial pol-
icy largely accepted the conservative connotations of the coalition government’s dis-
course. Even if some groups would like government to be slightly more ambitious or to 
implement reform more quickly, there are few signs of sustained, widespread pressure for 
a more genuinely radical agenda, even among manufacturers.
Death and resurrection? 2014 onwards
By 2014, it was clear that George Osborne, as chief economic policy-maker, had shifted 
decisively away from the idea of an activist industrial policy or at least any position that 
might constitute a paradigm shift: despite the threadbare evidence, his speeches began to 
celebrate the coalition’s success in rejuvenating British manufacturing (see Osborne, 
2014a, 2015). A speech dedicated to manufacturing in 2014 euphemistically reduced 
industrial policy to the notion of ‘backing businesses’ as part of the ‘long term economic 
plan’, alongside deficit reduction, cutting tax, and investing in education Osborne (2014b). 
The post-election budget in 2015 also marked the publication of the Conservative govern-
ment’s ‘productivity plan’. The associated document Fixing the Foundations did not con-
tain a single reference to manufacturing. There is a clear lack of strategic thinking evident 
in Fixing the Foundations; it lists the two drivers of productivity rather vaguely as ‘long 
term investment’ and ‘a dynamic economy’. Objectives related to ‘long term investment’ 
include skills, infrastructure, science and innovation, albeit with tax cuts at the top of the 
agenda, and alongside highly tenuous references to the Osborne agenda around reforming 
pensions tax relief (which was abandoned in early 2016). A flexible labour market appears 
to be the main objective of the ‘a dynamic economy’ category (with the inclusion of 
Osborne’s contentious ‘high pay, low welfare’ rhetoric). This section of the document also 
prioritises ‘planning freedoms, more houses to buy’ (HM Treasury, 2015: 7).
Revealingly, the final objective listed in this category is ‘Resurgent cities, a rebalanced 
economy and a thriving Northern Powerhouse’; the productivity plan therefore endorses 
Conservative plans for devolution to newly formed city-regions (HM Treasury, 2015: 41). 
In this regard, the coalition and Conservative governments appear to have continued the 
traditional role of sub-national layers in the delivery of industrial policy—yet their 
approach encompasses a subtle but important variation on previous practice. The coali-
tion abolished Labour’s regional layer of industrial policy, the Regional Development 
Agencies (RDAs), as soon as it took office. It replaced them with Local Enterprise 
Partnerships (LEPs), relatively loose networks of local civic and business leaders, with 
few resources to invest or powers by which to leverage private investment, broadly organ-
ised on a smaller, city-regional basis (although the Regional Growth Fund, which offers 
seed investments to projects able to attract private investment in areas most affected by 
public sector cuts, has distributed £2.7 billion since 2010). As the structure of local gov-
ernment is reorganised around mayor-led city-regions with lower revenue grants from 
central government, we can broadly interpret these changes as a hollowing out of the 
(fairly limited) regional layer of vertical industrial policy that Blair and Brown had aug-
mented, in favour of a reinforcement of purely horizontal industrial policy mechanisms at 
the local level.
Yet just as it appeared the true colours of ‘Osbornomics’ were being revealed, 23 June 
2016 happened, and in the aftermath of Britain’s decision to leave the EU, Theresa May 
replaced David Cameron as Prime Minister, and George Osborne was banished to the 
backbenches. May (2016) made a noteworthy speech during her abbreviated leadership 
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election campaign in which she advocated ‘proper industrial policy’ and criticised 
Osborne’s record in this regard, implying that more radical ‘economic reform’ was neces-
sary to improve productivity. The speech in fact echoed a speech in 2013 (when May was 
Home Secretary) in which she advocated ‘a more strategic role for the state in our economy’ 
(while simultaneously eschewing a so-called ‘beer and sandwiches’ approach to indus-
trial policy and ‘failed seventies-style corporatism’) (May, 2013). The 2016 campaign 
speech also included a rebuke for Osborne’s approach to regional policy, in calling for ‘a 
plan to help not one or even two of our great regional cities, but every single one of them’. 
Yet her speech concentrated on issues around corporate governance rather than industrial 
policy per se and made only a passing reference to manufacturing when signalling she 
would have blocked the takeover of leading British-based pharmaceuticals firm 
AstraZeneca by global giant Pfizer had it proceeded (her words were revealed as rather 
hollow when she acquiesced in the first week of her premiership to the takeover of 
Britain’s world-leading microchip producer ARM by the Japanese firm SoftBank). She 
also neglected to address what impact ‘Brexit’ might have on British manufacturing 
exports, despite stating categorically in the same speech that ‘Brexit means Brexit’. The 
speech advocated, at most, a Cable-lite industrial strategy, calling simply for ‘a better 
research and development policy’ and ‘more Treasury-backed bonds for new infrastruc-
ture projects’, in an unwieldy list which also included policy proposals on domestic 
energy costs and house-building.
It is worth noting that, unlike The Plan for Growth in 2011, Fixing the Foundations was 
published solely by the Treasury (despite its foreword being co-signed by the new Business 
Secretary, Sajid Javid). Its publication therefore marks symbolically the neutering of BIS 
(and its ministers) that had begun towards the end of the coalition era. The November 2015 
spending review imposed a 20% budget reduction on the department from 2015 to 2020, 
matching the cut it had endured 2010–2015. Although the science budget was partially 
protected, cuts included the abolition of the Manufacturing Advisory Service. After leav-
ing office, Cable promulgated more systematically the notion that the Treasury had under-
mined his industrial policy ambitions, in a letter co-authored with Labour’s former business 
spokesperson Chuka Umunna. Cable and Umunna (2015) criticised the Treasury for per-
ennially ‘undermining or abandoning productive, long term government interventions’. 
Theresa May has actually replaced BIS with the Department for Business, Energy and 
Industrial Strategy, but her approach to the departmental configurations of industrial policy 
remains unclear. While the return of a direct reference to industrial policy in the depart-
ment’s name is noticeable, so too is the fact that the department has lost responsibility for 
higher education and trade policy (both integral to industrial policy) and effectively been 
merged with the Department for Energy and Climate Change.
Industrial policy has been an important feature of the early tenure of Jeremy Corbyn, 
the left-wing member of parliament (MP) selected as leader of the Labour Party after the 
2015 election. His ally and shadow chancellor John McDonnell has drawn upon Marianna 
Mazzucato’s (2013) work on ‘the entrepreneurial state’ to advocate higher levels of public 
investment in advanced manufacturing R&D, principally through a national investment 
bank (see Stewart, 2015), although Corbyn (2015) himself has (seemingly inadvertently) 
criticised the tax allowances offered to many companies to incentivise R&D and capital 
investment, by denouncing so-called ‘corporate welfare’ (see Farnsworth, 2015). There is 
little evidence of a coherent Corbyn industrial policy approach, with the incoherence of 
Corbyn’s position underlined by his own apparent indifference regarding Brexit. In con-
trast, Corbyn predecessor Ed Miliband had a much clearer approach to industrial policy, 
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albeit not one that differed significantly from that pursued by the coalition. Reviews led 
by Mike Wright (2014) (Executive Director of Jaguar Land Rover) for the party, and 
former Labour cabinet minister Andrew Adonis for Labour-friendly think-tank Policy 
Network (2014), essentially endorsed the direction of policy development proposed by 
Vince Cable, albeit with higher levels of public investment. Adonis (who later accepted a 
role within the Conservative government as chair of the National Infrastructure 
Commission) was slightly more critical of existing practice, in that his review made the 
case for a stronger BIS department. Nevertheless, even as the Conservative Party moved 
away from this agenda in 2014 and 2015, Labour did not make industrial policy a feature 
of its 2015 election campaign.
Conclusion
The period since the 2008 crisis in Britain has seen a plethora of initiatives related to 
industrial policy, often focused on manufacturing. Policy innovation was propelled, it 
seems, by a new degree of comfort among policy elites, especially since 2010, towards 
acknowledging the unbalanced nature of Britain’s pre-crisis economy. The agenda seemed 
to wane after 2014—indicating perhaps the hollow nature of the ‘paradigm shift’—but 
the ascendance of Theresa May following the referendum on EU membership perhaps 
signals the resumption of the coalition government’s earlier agenda. Yet the process of 
policy change has followed neither Hall’s nor Baker’s account of the ‘three order’ of post-
crisis policy change in relation to, respectively, macroeconomic policy and macropruden-
tial regulation. Industrial policy innovation is not the product of a ‘slow burn’ crisis in 
manufacturing that resulted in a policy learning process because manufacturing decline 
has been at least decades in the making. There is also the fact that apparent innovation 
was clearly triggered by the crisis of 2008, with little evidence of incremental policy 
change before this point. But 2008 was above all a financial crisis which did not dispro-
portionately disrupt existing trends within the manufacturing sector. The rebalancing nar-
rative implicated manufacturing but essentially represented the co-option of the motif of 
manufacturing decline into attempts by elites to manage wider economic problems. 
Innovation has stalled not because key stakeholders have resisted meaningful reforms at 
a later stage of implementation, but rather because the relevant policy-making bodies lack 
the power, resources, expertise and even inclination to push for a more radical industrial 
policy agenda. Generally speaking, post-crisis industrial policy innovation represents a 
shift in policy discourse not matched by policy substance. In fact, the radical discourse 
smuggles some quite conservative meanings into elite framing of manufacturing decline, 
which have served to constrain innovation ideationally and reinforce rather than address 
incoherence within industrial policy delivery mechanisms.
Baker adds a ‘variety of crisis’ variable to the ‘three orders’ framework to account for 
the process of policy change in relation to macroprudential regulation; this is a highly 
relevant variable to this study, but Table 1 summarises two further variables required to 
account for post-crisis industrial policy change in Britain since 2008. First, the differ-
ences in the institutional framework in which policy is forged are a decisive factor. 
Macroeconomic policy and financial regulation both have well-established institutional 
processes encompassing powerful public bodies—the former houses key economic pol-
icy functions discharged by agents with near-peerless authority to set agendas, and the 
latter comprises largely depoliticised bodies which enjoy a privileged autonomy within 
government (partly because of the patronage of the former framework), including the de 
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facto ability to reform its own formal structures. Of course, these differences may help to 
further explain the different processes of policy change identified by Hall and Baker—the 
depoliticised institutions of financial regulation may have empowered policy insiders to 
resist change more fiercely, despite evidence of economic malfunction in the finance sec-
tor. Yet industrial policy provides an even starker contrast. Industrial policy mechanisms 
are operated by a relatively junior government department or local authorities. In fact, the 
shape and powers of both institutional settings are highly dependent on the preferences of 
agents elsewhere within the institutional framework of Whitehall and are frequently 
reformed via top-down processes to suit wider political initiatives. It is little surprise that 
radical policy discourse translates into, at most, moderate reform. The opponents of 
macroprudential regulation have an arena in which to contest reform, whereas the advo-
cates of industrial policy have far more limited opportunities to promote their agenda.
We must also consider, second, the status of the associated economic activities in the 
British growth model. Manufacturing clearly plays a subordinate role in the economy. 
Even if we were to accept that elite actors sought to substantially boost manufacturing 
through a more activist industrial policy in the wake of the financial crisis, we can con-
clude that the paucity of the ideational and institutional resources available to them rep-
resented a significant barrier to meaningful change. Clearly, macroeconomic policy and 
financial regulation do not perform the same function within the growth model: the for-
mer plays a foundational role in establishing the parameters within which capitalism 
Table 1. Crisis responses in variable institutional environments.
Macroeconomic policy Financial regulation Industrial policy
Type of crisis Slow-burn: medium-
term aggregate 
under-performance 
throughout economy
Explosive: 
malfunction within 
finance sector
Habitual: long-
term decline of 
manufacturing sector
Type of 
institutionalisation
Dense, dominant: 
core economic policy 
functions within 
agenda-setting bodies 
(politicised)
Dense, privileged 
autonomy: oversight 
of key sector by 
powerful agencies 
(depoliticised)
Dispersed, 
subservient: contested 
policy mechanisms 
with limited strategic 
leadership
Relationship to 
growth model
Foundational: related 
to overall economic 
stewardship
Integral: sector is vital 
source of wealth and 
growth (compared to 
similar economies), 
concentrated in core 
region
Marginal: sector has 
limited economic 
role (compared to 
similar economies), 
concentrated in 
peripheral regions
Process of policy 
innovation
Piecemeal, 
technocratic changes 
with cross-party 
acquiescence 
coalesced into 
transformation of 
policy environment, 
after the election of 
a new government 
following perceived 
crisis peak
Apparent paradigm 
shift in regulatory 
principles, but not 
supported by wider 
elite thinking on 
economic policy. 
Policy innovations 
with potentially 
radical implications 
delayed at 
implementation stage
Shift in elite 
discourse towards 
manufacturing 
(including recognition 
of decline) but only 
after explosive crisis 
in finance sector. 
Policy innovations 
either limited or 
consistent with 
previous practice
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operates, whereas the latter performs a function similar to that which might be envisaged 
for industrial policy, insofar as it seeks to protect a certain set of industries while con-
straining their ability to threaten the public good. However, while the industries in ques-
tion for financial regulation are integral to the British growth model, this is not the case 
for industrial policy and the manufacturing sector. As such, whereas the macroprudential 
regulation agenda acts in part to contain demands for more radical policy change, in 
industrial policy, radical policy rhetoric serves to obscure the limited capacity of the 
British state to deliver policy innovation.
It is clear that an industrial policy paradigm shift has not occurred in Britain (and is not 
likely to). But the case raises important questions about post-crisis economic policy change 
in general. While there has been a great deal more noise around industrial policy since 
2008, and especially 2010, it seems that this noise paradoxically serves the same purpose 
as the pre-crisis silence from most parts of the political elite regarding manufacturing and 
industrial policy. The ongoing attempt by some key actors to proselytise the importance of 
manufacturing and the need for a new industrial policy approach may actually serve to 
reinforce its subservience, insofar as the discourse is framed by the conservative rebalanc-
ing narrative, therefore circumscribing the limits of policy innovation. Clearly, while the 
discourse challenges some of the tenets of neoliberal economic statecraft, we can more 
fully evaluate the significance of this shift by studying its status within a wider institutional 
and ideational environment. Thus, we can better comprehend how what could be seen as a 
partial repudiation of neoliberalism can nevertheless serve to reinforce a growth model 
animated by neoliberalism. This may have important implications for how policy change 
in the wake of capitalist crises is understood, insofar as ideas, institutions and interests are 
shown to interact in different ways due to a wide variety of factors.
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